Un/Speakability and Radical Otherness: The Ethics of Trauma in Bram Stoker's *Dracula*

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Only the true speech of the living dead is the true speech, only the speech of those who have been systematically deprived of the power of speech is true speech, and only in relation to this truth might any other truths have worth from henceforth.

—J. M. Bernstein[1]

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Upon his return from a trip to Castle Dracula with Mina and their son Quincy at the end of Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, Jonathan Harker reminisces with Dr. Van Helsing about their previous trans-continental adventures to hunt down Count Dracula. Harker ponders the truth of these past events and the value of the documents they have in their possession for recording and authenticating that truth. Removing the documents from the safe, Harker realizes that

"in all the mass of material of which the record is composed, there is hardly one authentic document; nothing but a mass of type-writing, except the later notebooks of Mina and Seward and myself, and Van Helsing's memorandum" (Stoker 1997, 326-27). Harker then confides in Van Helsing: "We could hardly ask anyone, even did we wish to, to accept these as proofs of so wild a story" (327). The problem of documentation is, of course, accentuated in the process of the production of the narrative itself, which as the prefatory note indicates was subjected to an editorial apparatus that eliminated "all needless matters" and ensured the absence of any error from memory (5). Critics have discussed this issue of documentation and representational transparency in *Dracula* in terms of narrative (un)reliability, particularly as a function of literary conventions of textual excess and the transgression of discourses of rationality, intelligibility, and sanity that underpin the gothic romance (see for example Riquelme 2002, 560). Nonetheless, there is more to this problematic of textual excess here than limited documentation, discursive conventions, or textual indeterminacy that is 'always already' inherent in the undecidability of language. Indeed, the issue can be more productively understood in relation to the specificity of the traumatic event in the novel, namely the vampiric attack. The vampiric attack needs to be understood not only in terms of its traumatic core (the horror), but also its endless repetitions—the way in which vampires, including Count Dracula, the three female vampires in his castle, and the undead Lucy, continually prey on and haunt their victims (Jonathan Harker, Lucy Westenra, Mina Harker, and the children)—its paradoxical structure (it can be seen but cannot be known), and its apocalyptic potentialities. All of these elements stand out as extraordinary experiences of terror that exceed memory, writing, and representation.

The novel makes explicit this connection between traumatic experience, as embodied in the horror of the endless vampiric attacks and the paradoxical structure of trauma, and the problematic of memory, representation, and writing. Indeed, prior to his conversation with Van Helsing in the final scene of the novel, Jonathan Harker describes Castle Dracula as that "old ground which *was*, *and is*, to us full of vivid and terrible memories." As he surveys the ground there, Harker reflects: "It was impossible to believe that the things which we had seen with our own eyes and heard with our own ears were living truths. *Every trace of all that had been was blotted out*" (Stoker 1997, 326; emphasis added). This passage is emblematic of the ways in which the traumatic core of the vampiric attack underwrites the novel as a whole, and constitutes a central site for rethinking the significance of trauma and its indelible effect on memory and representation in this novel. This passage locates the troubling character of the vampiric attack on a number of levels. First, Jonathan Harker *is* still haunted by these "terrible memories," even after

Count Dracula, "the author of all this our sorrow," has presumably been dispatched (193). Despite the apparent containment of the threat of the foreign monster at the end of the novel, there is no simple return to normality, no celebration of the triumph of good over evil, and no closure for the victims. Not only, as many critics have pointed out, does Dracula's blood run through the veins of the Harkers' son Quincey, while Mina remains contaminated in some sense by the vampiric, but also the vampire's victims continue to be haunted by Dracula's polymorphous spectral presence. Second, an overt link is established between traumatic experiences and place, suggesting that something of the original trauma still inheres at the site of its occurrence. Third, this passage is remarkable for its obliteration of the memory of the victims of the vampiric attack, especially Lucy Westenra. The survivors' obsession with authentic documents that can presumably validate the living betrays the memory of the dead, and detracts from the ethical project of bearing witness to them. The obverse side of this ethical project is the exclusion of Dracula, the persecutor, and his voice from the documents, ensuring the disavowal of the Other as incomprehensible. Fourth, the ambiguity of the last sentence quoted above—where were these traces blotted out exactly? were they blotted out in his mind and memory or in the physical geography of the place itself?—testifies to trauma's paradoxical structure, and to the extent to which memories of the traumatic event cannot be consciously recovered so that a seamlessly truthful narrative can be produced or communicated. Indeed, the novel as a whole registers these endless vampiric attacks as overwhelming psychic and mental events that not only shatter the victims' subjectivities, memories, and worldly experience, but also resist seamless integration into consciousness, full knowledge, and representation.

However, the paradoxical structure of trauma and its significance for understanding the novel have met with an inexplicable critical silence. Although a number of critics have argued for Stoker's liberal appropriation of popular psychoanalytic concepts, especially the Freudian theory of female hysteria as the origin of his representation of the anemic and anorexic female vampires (Gelder 1994; Moss 1997), most psychoanalytic criticism of the novel has been exclusively fixated on examining the vampire in *Dracula* as a sexual metaphor, without interrogating the links between the vampire and trauma.[2] For such critics, the vampire constitutes a site for examining contemporary popular anxieties about Victorian gender and sexual ideologies, especially the New Woman question and the performativity of gender, including the reversal and inversion of gender norms (Auerbach 1982; Senf 1982; Roth 1997) and homoeroticism (Craft 1997; Schaffer 1997). This critical obsession with the vampire's sexuality is quite understandable, since as Ken Gelder has pointed out, the doctors in the novel itself (Van Helsing and

Dr. Seward) fail to provide any psychoanalytic insight into the vampire's sexual motivation: the coding of sexuality in the novel is structured around a tension between the overcoding of sexual performance and the undercoding of sexual utterance (Gelder 1994, 66-67). Consequently, Gelder can convincingly claim that "there is so much to say about sexual motivation in *Dracula* precisely because the novel's own analysts have nothing to say about it whatsoever" (67). And yet, as important as this insight into the sexuality of the vampire is, psychoanalytic critics can explain the novel's silences only in terms of the psychosexual mechanisms of denial and the repression of the child's unconscious ambivalence about the mother (the return of the repressed). As such, critical interpretation of the novel has neglected the ways in which the trauma of vampiric attacks, their eternal return, and their spectral presence in the victims' lives are not repressed but *registered belatedly* in the victims' unconscious.[3]

Shifting attention to the operation of trauma and its paradoxical structure in Stoker's *Dracula*, I maintain, can shed new light not only on the mechanism of belatedness (rather than repression) in understanding and communicating the traumatic core of the vampiric attack in the novel, but also on the process of bearing witness to trauma's victims. This focus in turn allows us to consider the representation of the vampire as a radically inhuman Other, whose motives and desires cannot be accounted for within the limits of human discourse and thought. More specifically, I will examine these epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical aporias in relation to vampiric trauma with and against the claims of cultural trauma theory about representation, witnessing, and ethical responsibility for the Other in a post-Holocaust world.[4] Responding to the epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical implications of the Holocaust, cultural trauma theorists frame their discussion within the limits, or failure, of the representation of what is deemed unspeakably inhuman: unimaginable acts of genocide, total destruction in the concentration camps, and the absolute evil of the Other, which may presumably exist outside the boundaries of human thought and discourse as incomprehensible, unthinkable, and inconceivable.[5] At the same time, trauma theorists reframe their postmodern, deconstructionist sensibilities within a reconfiguration of ethical responsibility and the relationship between representation and the referential world (Lockhurst 2006, 506).

Before I proceed, let me make it clear from the outset that I am not suggesting here that Bram Stoker's canonical vampiric narrative was in any way consciously invested in the epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical aporias that inform contemporary cultural trauma theory, which has of course emerged in the wake of extreme catastrophic events such as the Holocaust. Indeed, the novel's vampires remain a product of fantasy, serving as an ideo-

logical trope that embodies and displaces the immanent social contradictions of Victorian England. However, if contemporary trauma theory draws on Freud's concern for war time shell-shock, then it shares a belated connection with Stoker's *Dracula* as part of the late Victorian response to modernity and its dark history of violence, disruption, and the proliferation of new technologies of mass destruction. In fact, twentieth-century violence, including the Holocaust, cannot be adequately understood without accounting for the five hundred years of European conquest, terrorism, and genocide committed against indigenous people around the world. The Holocaust itself, moreover, cannot simply be interpreted as an aberration in European history; arguably, its eruption is continuous with centuries of anti-Semitism and persecution of European Jewry. Hence, one tendency in trauma and Holocaust studies is to question and remap the discourse on the alleged uniqueness and exceptionality of the Holocaust, pointing out the urgency for drawing parallels between the Holocaust and other historical genocides, past and present.[6]

To this extent, the apocalyptic potentialities of Dracula's "reverse colonization" (Arata 1997), and his threat to subjugate Britons and transform them into his minions by feeding off and corrupting their women (Stoker 1997, 267), amount to a projective displacement of the history of ethnic cleansing and racial extermination in which the British Empire engaged in its colonies, and which bears uncanny resemblance to other histories of genocide, including the Holocaust. In relation to these apocalyptic potentialities, therefore, the vampire in Stoker's *Dracula* serves as a metaphor for the extreme forms of violence that humanity witnessed in the past, continues to witness in the present, and will probably witness in the future. Moreover, the vampire here functions as a critical site on which the aforementioned epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical aporias can be projected and interrogated as an investment in fantasy that, nonetheless, has significant implications for our understanding of trauma and the history of mechanical destruction and industrialized killing. As Omer Bartov has correctly argued, the scenes of unimaginable destruction in the Great Wars and the Holocaust are themselves a "product of the human imagination," which in its omnipotence makes hell on earth "anything but an unimaginable reality" (Bartov 2003, 89, 94).

Reading vampiric trauma in Stoker's *Dracula* with and against the claims of cultural trauma theory, I contend, allows us to interrogate and reconsider the gaps and omissions in the claims of cultural trauma theory about representation, witnessing, and the radical alterity of the persecutory vampiric Other. I argue, therefore, that vampiric trauma constitutes an allegorical site in the novel for exploring these inextricably interrelated epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical aporias in a way that challenges and extends the dominant discourse on trauma in trauma theory and Holocaust studies. From

this perspective, the novel suggests that the rhetoric of unspeakability in trauma theory is overstated, so clearing a space for rethinking the conditions of possibility under which traumatic experiences can be rendered speakable. While it recognizes that traumatic knowledge exceeds representation within the specific paradoxical structure of traumatic experiences *at the individual level*, the novel makes it still possible to recover and communicate such a knowledge *at the collective level*. As they mediate their traumatic experiences privately in their letters, diaries, and journals, the vampire's victims, especially Jonathan Harker, Mina, and Lucy, can only gain a belated and an incomplete understanding of its traumatic kernel, its horror. Individually, that is, the memory of the vampiric attacks can only be registered in their unconscious, and so remains unspeakable. However, Stoker's novel shows that such horrific attacks are still speakable and representable through the collaborative efforts between survivors and secondary witnesses, even though such an effort can only produce a fragmentary and incomplete narrative. Indeed, such a collective project is necessary for working through the trauma. At the same time, however, the novel portrays the risks involved in any collective project that imagines or constructs a community on the basis of trauma, full identification, and the transference process, for such a project may ultimately be founded on the violent obliteration of the victims and their memories, as well as on the violent and xenophobic disavowal of the Other.

Equally, Stoker's novel makes it possible to revalue the ethical imperative to bear witness to trauma's victims that may in itself end up repeating the horrors of the originary trauma. Lucy's narrative of vampiric transformation and destruction by what Christopher Craft calls the "Crew of Light" (Craft 1997, 445n2) shows the limits and impossibility of witnessing as described by Giorgio Agamben (2002): for Lucy in her alleged inhumanity as an undead is now excluded from human discourse, and the witnesses themselves are excluded from her traumatic experience. More importantly, however, the novel points to the inhuman potentiality of testimonial speech acts that are predicated upon mutilating the victims and obliterating their presumably sacred memories. Doubling and inverting Dracula's presumed sexual exploits with his victims through blood transfusions, voyeurism, and group sex, the band of witnesses forecloses Lucy's Otherness: in killing her, they frame her murder within a theological narrative of redemption and salvation that invests her death with meaning for them, while absolving them from complicity in her murder. Once Lucy functionalizes their redemption narrative, her presence and memory are obliterated from the text altogether.

These epistemological and ethical problems become tied up with the metaphysical question of Otherness—and specifically the ambiguous humanity of the Un-dead Other, who presumably exists outside the limits of

representation and signification as an altogether different species—and the victims' psychosexual entanglement with their incomprehensible persecutor. The novel subtly reconfigures the radical alterity of the persecutory vampiric Other through Mina's intimate relationship with Dracula, which develops in what Primo Levi has called the "gray zone," that ambivalent site where the slippages and interchangeability between persecutors and victims are continually re-enacted (Levi 1989, 42). Nonetheless, the novel foregrounds the extent to which the relationships between persecutors and victims evolve within the specific dialectic of perverse pleasure—the victim's violent sexual fantasies about her persecutor and willing submission to his desires—that remains sublimated in Levi's discussion of the "gray zone." Moreover, the victim's complicity with her persecutor, her erotic investment in him, and her recognition of the slippages between them clear a space for articulating a sense of ethical responsibility for the inhuman persecutor, grounded in what Emmanuel Levinas calls the pre-ontological susceptibility to an Other.[7] Consequently, Stoker's classic vampire novel allows for the re-inscription of the incomprehensible alterity of the vampiric Other *in relation to* the victim's subjectivity and desire within the language of the intimate and the familiar. The novel therefore makes it possible for the vampire, and by extension the persecutor in trauma theory, to be represented at the same level of representation with their victims in that specular space in the mirror, where the vampire's subjectivity has long been foreclosed.

Vampiric Trauma: From Unspeakability to Collective Representation

Recent theories of trauma have emphasized Freud's diagnosis of its belatedness (*nachträglich*), which results from the victim's failure to comprehend, let alone communicate, the traumatic experience and make it accessible to the conscious mind. Unable fully to assimilate their experiences of battle, Freud's patients, the First World War veterans who suffered from war shell-shock trauma, re-enacted the scene of their trauma in their nightmares, dreams, flashbacks, and hallucinations, failing to know or even see the traumatic kernel of this "terrible war" (Freud 1953, 9). Registered into their unconscious, this traumatic experience, or "traumatic neurosis" as he calls it (9), can only be assimilated belatedly after a period of latency. Consequently, the patient is "obliged to *repeat* the repressed material as a contemporary experience," and what continues to be repeated, because it cannot be known or remembered, is in fact the "essential part of it" (19, 18). For Cathy Caruth, therefore, trauma is structured around a paradox that "the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness" (1996, 91-92).

Applied to the Holocaust, however, this belatedness in the understanding and representation of traumatic experiences takes the form of unspeakability. Geoffrey Hartman, for example, does not disavow knowledge and representation as such, but suggests "the existence of a traumatic kind [of knowledge], one that cannot be made entirely conscious in the sense of being fully retrieved or communicated without distortion" (1995, 537). Although he notes that traumatic knowledge can never be totally captured, Hartman does not ponder the possibility of narrativizing such traumatic events within available interpretive frameworks, nor does he consider the conditions under which such a knowledge can be made possible. In fact, he even questions the need for exposing the obscenity of the Holocaust, for in his view no redemption or salvation can be obtained from such a knowledge. The ultimate conclusion in the face of immense horrific events may then simply be, in the words of Dominick LaCapra, "silent awe" (2001, 93).

Stoker's *Dracula* acknowledges that trauma's victims (especially Jonathan Harker, Mina, and Lucy) may fail to represent the traumatic core or horror of the vampires' attacks, but suggests that this rhetoric of unspeakability is overstated. While traumatic vampiric attacks cannot be fully known or represented accurately and coherently *at the individual level*, it is possible, even advisable, to represent such events *at the collective level* through what Mina calls "working together," and what Van Helsing calls "the power of combination" (Stoker 1997, 197, 210). As long as these victims continue to deal with their traumas privately in their letters, journals, and diaries, these victims remain not only unable to confront the traumatic core of the vampiric attack that continues to haunt them by its spectral presence, but also incapable of registering and representing these traumatic events in language. Nonetheless, the collaborative production of the narrative itself establishes a sense of community between survivors and witnesses, without suggesting that such a narrative can offer more than a glimpse of the lives of the victims from between the lines of their testimonies. As such, Stoker's *Dracula* forces us to address and question the motivations, desires, and agendas underlying the ubiquity of the rhetoric of unspeakability in trauma theory.

The paradox of the vampiric attack, its belatedness and unspeakability, is embodied in the failure of the victims to know and communicate the traumatic core of their experiences at the level of individual consciousness as mediated in the private technologies of writing journals, diaries, letters, and memoranda. The horror of the vampiric attack, its violence and violation—whether Jonathan Harker's hallucinations, nocturnal molestations and "violent brain fever," Lucy's "bad dreams" and sleepwalking, or Mina's scar, trance and telepathy—are thus all registered, though not experienced, in their unconscious. For example, after he is attacked (or seduced) by the three

female vampires in Dracula's palace early on in the novel, Harker notices thinking "strange things which I dare not confess to my own soul" (Stoker 1997, 24). And later on, after the shaving incident when he sees the Count crawling down the castle wall from his window, he observes that he is "encompassed about with terrors that I dare not think of" (1997, 39). That is, the act of seeing vampires and witnessing their attacks does not guarantee any absolute knowledge of these traumatic events. Indeed, Harker cannot know and understand the full significance of the horror of the vampiric trauma, even if he sees it, for he cannot confront, as Caruth puts it, "the reality of the way that its violence has not yet been fully known" (1996, 6). Consequently, the victims of the vampiric attack engage in a constant delay in, not repression of, understanding these traumatic events, refusing to know their trauma and preferring to live in ignorance. Thus, when Jonathan hands his note-book to Mina in the chapter where he proposes to her, he informs her: "The secret is here, and I do not want to know it. . . . Here is the book. Take it and keep it, read it if you will, but never let me know" (Stoker 1997, 100). This refusal to see and know the trauma can also be seen in the ways in which the "Crew of Light" responds to the signs of Mina's possible transformation. The men note, for example, that she "looked paler than usual" (Stoker 1997, 223, 230), and she herself reports how "terribly weak and spiritless" she starts to feel (228). Although Mina exhibits these symptoms a long time after Dracula's attack on Lucy, Mina and the "Crew of Light" cannot acknowledge or recognize it. Unable to admit the trauma to themselves, the vampires' victims can only register the traumatic vampiric attack on their unconscious, only to emerge later in disruptive and shattering form in their lives.

Acting out the traumatic kernel of the vampiric attack within the paradoxical structure of trauma, the victims of the vampiric attack remain haunted by the vampire's spectrality. Freud describes trauma as a spectral and demonic agency, for it represents the ways in which an individual remains possessed and haunted by a force or power from the past that cannot be easily exorcized from the patient's unconscious. Hence, Freud notes: "The impression they give is of being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some daemonic power" (1953, 23). As such, Caruth locates the pathology of trauma in "the repeated *possession* of the one who experiences it," adding that "To be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or event" (2003, 193; emphasis in original). So, as the "Crew of Light" prepares to open Lucy's coffin for the first time, Harker states: "I could not for my life get away from the feeling that there was someone else amongst us. I suppose it was the recollection, so powerfully brought home to me by the grim surroundings, of that terrible experience in Transylvania" (Stoker 1997, 220). Harker remains

haunted by the presence of the vampire, a haunting triggered by the evoca-
tion of the originary site of trauma that makes him lapse into unconscious-
ness and forgetfulness at different points in the narrative. Similarly, Lucy con-
tinues to be haunted by Dracula's spectrality to the extent that she is inca-
pable of knowing the thing that haunts her. She thus informs Mina that she
"didn't quite dream; but it all seemed to be real. I only wanted to be here in
the spot. I don't know why, for I was afraid of something—I don't know
what" (94). Try as hard as they wish, the victims of the vampiric attacks can-
not forget these traumas. Even when they explicitly assert their inability to
recollect anything or anyone, these victims fail to repress the recurrent
hauntings of the vampire. This impossibility of forgetting or repressing the
horror of the vampiric attack constitutes the 'disaster' of the vampiric attack
itself. In other words, there is no escape from, or repression of, the vampire
and his mortal bite, but an eternal return, or a recurrent encounter with its
horror that, in Caruth's words, "attests to its endless impact on life" (1996, 7).
To this extent, Stoker's *Dracula* registers the obsessive, eternal return of the
ghostly or demonic vampire as a "repetition compulsion" that does not sim-
ply testify to the vampire's omnipotent, overriding oral needs, as psychoana-
lysts would have it, but to the victims' inability to know, comprehend, mas-
ter, or repress the traumatic kernel of the vampiric attack.

Mina and Jonathan Harker reveal another important dimension of the
unspeakability of traumatic knowledge at the individual level, namely the
inability of the victim or the survivor to articulate the traumatic core of the
vampiric attack in their own language. Indeed, the victims do not seem capa-
ble of producing their own knowledge of the traumatic events, proving that,
to quote Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, "the speaking subject constantly
bears witness to a truth that nonetheless continues to escape him, a truth that
is essentially not available to its own speaker" (1992, 15). Mina makes overt
this inability to represent and articulate the traumatic kernel of the vampir-
ic attack in the victim's own words. Although it is Mina who compiles the
book with the help of her husband, she herself does not record or report the
scene where she is allegedly attacked by Dracula; rather, it is reported by Dr.
Seward (Stoker 1997, 247). This seems to have puzzled some critics who have
questioned Mina's inability to transcribe the events that happened and will
happen to her personally, as if she were incognizant of those events; it seems
to them that she could create a "distinctive voice for herself" only by "repeat-
ing and reconfiguring the language of others" (Riquelme 2002, 569-70).
Only when read in the context of her traumatic experience and its paradox-
ical structure can we understand why she herself cannot record the experi-
ence from her own perspective, for once it happened to her, that experience
is forever lost. In her inability to confront the traumatic core of the vampir-

ic attack, moreover, Mina stammers and fails to articulate the cause of the traumatic event. Thus, in a journal written during the pursuit of Count Dracula, Mina writes about "the . . . the . . . the . . . Vampire," and wonders why she hesitated to "write the word" (Stoker 1997, 307). Similarly, Jonathan is incapable not only of narrating the events in his own words, but also of speaking altogether. At one point, for example, he asks Dr. Seward himself to write the events down for him in order to render them accurately, and he later notes how his own voice "f-fails" him (285, 288). Like trauma, that is, the horror at the core of the vampiric attack can neither be consciously experienced nor can it be communicated without distortion in the survivors' and witnesses' testimonies.

Nonetheless, Stoker's *Dracula* offers a space for challenging the ubiquity of the rhetoric of unspeakability in trauma theory, suggesting that a collective effort on the part of survivors and witnesses can ultimately render traumatic events speakable and representable, however fragmentary and contradictory that narrative may be.[8] Indeed, Peter Garrett correctly argues that this "movement from isolation and uncertainty of individual accounts to the mutual support and assurance of shared knowledge and beliefs drives the development of the whole narrative" (2003, 127). While Mina insists that the private thoughts of the victims must be made public, because "working together and with absolute trust, we can surely be stronger than if some of us were in the dark," Van Helsing extols the virtues of the "power of combination" (Stoker 1997, 197, 210). In fact, Mina takes a leading role in the reproduction of the narrative, prompting Van Helsing to idealize her as the mentor and guide to the group, although this role remains defined in her capacity as a mother and teacher within the strictures of Victorian gender ideology. The collective production of the novel as a public event is predicated upon mutual trust as Mina says, and on total exposure to the other members of the group, rendering everyone equally vulnerable yet empowered. As Van Helsing suggests to Mina, "We have told our secrets, and yet no one who has told is the worse for it" (208). Consequently, it becomes possible for the victims and survivors to come to terms with their traumatic experiences and relegate them to the past. Jonathan Harker, for example, notes how in the past he "felt impotent, and in the dark, and distrustful. But now that I know, I am not afraid, even of the Count" (168).

Through its work of reproducing and "knitting together" (Stoker 1997, 199) the narrative thus becomes the site for imagining and constructing an alternative community for those we have identified as the "Crew of Light," yet this does not guarantee that the narrative of the traumatic events that forms the basis of that community is coherent and unified. Ultimately, the vampire as an ideological figure does not simply "unif[y]," as Franco Moretti

says, but also embodies and disavows the "different interests and cultural paradigms of the dominant class (law, commerce, the land, science) under the banner of the common good" (1997, 438). Indeed, the novel suggests that such a record of collective trauma is necessarily fragmentary, partial, incomplete, and contradictory, allowing only for a glimpse of the traumatic core of the vampiric attack in the "disfigured language of testimony and remembrance" (Bernard-Donals and Glejzer 2003, 260). This disfigured language, this language of the disfigured, fails to capture and represent the traumatic core of Dracula's attack, but constitutes a "representation of its fragments, fragments that do not comprise the suffering, or the injustice, or the bafflement of the individuals whose lives are between the lines of such records" (2003, 247). Failing to produce a definitive narrative, a true representation, of the trauma is nonetheless not an excuse for deferring or disavowing its inscription altogether, for such an incomplete and fragmentary record can indeed be the most effective way to represent such an experience. Emmanuel Levinas suggests that representations of genocide and trauma need to be placed in a conversation and should be open to interruptions and disagreements, in order to maintain such events as a "hole in history" that cannot be filled (1997, 93). Any engagement with trauma and genocide should abandon, in the words of Robert Eaglestone, "the desire for a complete history, for the openness of infinite discussion" (2000, 104). The potential of collective narrativizing of traumatic events for working through such events notwithstanding, the novel also addresses the epistemological and ethical aporias involved in any collective project that imagines or constructs a community founded not only on the basis of trauma, but also on the processes of full identification and transference between victims, witnesses, and survivors. I will now turn to these issues as they emerge in relation to the aporetics of witnessing.

The Aporetics of Testimony: The Inhumanity of Witnessing

Lucy's narrative of vampiric transformation and destruction at the hands of the "Crew of Light" constitutes a critical site for interrogating and reconfiguring the popular trope of the impossibility of witnessing in trauma theory and Holocaust studies. The novel does not simply refuse any act of witnessing to Lucy, the victim whose narrative remains excluded from within the collective narrative. More importantly, it presents the inhumanity of testimonial speech acts that become involved in the mutilation of the victims' bodies and the obliteration of their memories. In *Remnants of Auschwitz*, Giorgio Agamben interrogates the impossibility of bearing witness to those who perished in the Holocaust within the gaps opened between the perfect witnesses, those who inscribed the story of their survival, and the "submerged, the

complete witnesses," those who "have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute" (2002, 33). These "complete witnesses" are the drowned *Muselmänner*, the inmates of the camps who were beyond hope and were referred to derogatorily as 'Muslims.' Living on the brink of extinction, the *Muselmänner* are "already too empty to really suffer," existing only in their infinite potentiality for suffering in the realm of total finitude (44). As such, they lack voice or are altogether mute, for they "have nothing to say, nor do they have instructions or memories to be transmitted. They have no 'story,' no 'face,' and even less do they have 'thought'" (34). No wonder the *Muselmänner* were referred to as "living dead," "walking corpses" and "mummy men" (54), marking the limits of the human and collapsing the distinction between the human and non-human, or in Agamben's words, "man and non-man" (47). This implosion of boundaries and limits situates the *Muselmann* outside human discourse, and hence their stories become unspeakable and unrepresentable. Their testimony is thus silent, a "missing testimony," and bearing witness to them becomes itself paradoxical, because "the survivors speak in their stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses" (34). For Agamben, it is thus impossible to bear witness to the *Muslemann*, because those who volunteer to bear witness to them enter signification by being excluded from it. This exclusion, in Agamben's opinion, is double: it is impossible to bear witness to it "from the inside, since no one can bear witness from the inside of death"; and it is impossible from the outside, "since the outsider is by definition excluded from the event" (2002, 35).

In these terms, Lucy Westenra, as one of the Undead, the living dead, and the one who is reduced to the figure of bare life by the demands of the (pseudo-)scientific rationality of the "Crew of Light," is the embodiment of the *Muselmann*, the true and complete witness, to whom the "Crew of Light," the perfect witnesses, cannot bear witness. Like the *Muselmann*, Lucy belongs, as Van Helsing says, to the "nothings of the common dead" (Stoker 1997, 179). In her Undead being, Lucy is viewed as a "remnant," (188); with her "pointed teeth, the bloodstained, voluptuous mouth . . . the whole carnal and unspiritual appearance, seeming like a devilish mockery of Lucy's sweet purity," she has become a "Thing," a nightmarish simulacrum of the original human Lucy (190). Lucy, for Van Helsing, is one of those "foul things of the night like [Dracula]—without heart or conscience, preying on the bodies and the souls of those we love best" (209). As such, Lucy collapses the distinctions between the human and the inhuman, becoming a horrific imitation of her original human form. Undergoing vampiric transformation from within, Lucy is no longer considered human. And as a simulacrum, an inauthentic imitation, Lucy cannot be allowed to inhabit the interiority of human discourse, and her speech and voice are effaced and forgotten. As

such, she can only exist outside the boundaries of language and sociability, in the heterotopic space of the cemeteries. While her voice and thoughts are made accessible through her diaries and memoranda before she is turned, after Chapter 12 they completely disappear. By the time news of the "bloofer lady" is made known (159), we only hear about Lucy from Mina and the testimony of the men, and after the hunt for Dracula begins, Lucy almost completely vanishes from the narrative.

The "Crew of Light," the perfect witnesses, fails to bear witness to Lucy's narrative of suffering and transformation not only because its members are excluded from the experience of vampiric transformation from both within and without as Agamben claims, but more importantly because their testimonial speech act is at its heart inhuman. Their testimony is predicated upon the foreclosure of Lucy's subjectivity as a victim, because she is identified with the persecutory Other so fully that she is assimilated into that Other. Van Helsing exemplifies this foreclosure of Otherness when he lectures his crew about the nosferatu and the urgency of killing it. Repulsed by vampirism as a criminal act against human existence and sameness, the "Crew of Light" kills Lucy in the most gruesome act of misogynistic violence in the novel. Indeed, the members of the "Crew of Light" are the only characters in the novel who are capable of such maniacal brutality; as John Riquelme correctly notes, not even Dracula is portrayed "in such bloody detail committing the kind of gruesome violence against a woman's body that the vampire hunters perpetrate" (2002, 564). This violent foreclosure of Lucy's subjectivity is an act of primary repression, which as Jean-Francois Lyotard explains is an exclusion and forgetting of the very possibility of the humanity of the Other (1988, 5).

Moreover, the attempt to bear witness to Lucy's experience fails because she is killed so that she can be incorporated within the divine law of salvation and redemption that Van Helsing and his allies are intent on instituting on her body and soul. Such a narrative of redemption and salvation "functionalizes" the victims, to quote Peter Haidu, as a "sacrifice which, properly enacted, might allow the victims the possibility of an eventual redemption" (quoted in Mandel 2001, 207). Lucy's death is made sensible within the law of redemption in order to validate the survivors' beliefs in those moments of doubt and darkness and absolve them from their complicity in her murder, which goes officially unreported and unpunished. Ironically, the "Crew of Light" kills Lucy while intent on establishing a sense of community between victims, witnesses, and survivors through processes of full identification and transference. Van Helsing and his crew reenact the role of surrogate victims in the novel, fully identifying with Lucy (and later with Mina) as a victim through various blood transfusions, to the extent that they become erotical-

ly invested in her through voyeurism and what might be interpreted as group sex (Stoker 1997, 190-93). Thus, the body of the female victim is staged as an erotic spectacle for male voyeuristic fantasies of power and domination. Indeed, Garrett correctly notes that the strategies of doubling and inversion between the band and their nemesis reproduce the same "obscene intimacies of vampirism" (2003, 130) that underwrite the relationships between the "Crew of Light" and the victims of vampiric trauma. Consequently, once she can no longer functionalize their trauma through a redemption narrative, the "Crew of Light" appropriates and controls the development of a narrative that excludes Lucy and erases her memory.

For Agamben, the failure to reach out to the realm of the inhuman becomes the condition of possibility for bearing witness to it. He argues "[t]hat precisely this inhuman impossibility of seeing [the truth of the *Muselmann*] is what calls and addresses the human, the apostrophe from which human beings cannot turn away—this and nothing else is testimony" (Agamben 2002, 54). *Dracula*, however, seems to caution against this utopian potentiality of testimonial speech acts by calling attention to the inhuman core of what is considered to be normatively human, or in Slavoj Žižek's words, the fact "that we are 'not-all human'" (2008, 17). In this way, therefore, Stoker's novel disassociates trauma from vampiric Being and re-presents it in light of the horror and brutality at the core of our humanity.[9] Indeed, the monster is within. As such, the novel decenters any discourse of witnessing, foregrounding the erotic investment and the potential violence within which any testimonial speech act can be mediated and mobilized. Moreover, following Philippe Mensard I would argue that Agamben's obsession with the *Muselmann* and his reification of this figure as an emblem of the concentration camp and of modernity in general obscures the multiple survivor and victim temporalities that coexisted in the universe of the camps, especially the complex dynamics between perpetrators and victims as well as the perpetrator's voice and perspective.[10] Contra Agamben, Stoker's novel teases out the perverse pleasure underpinning the relationship between persecutors and victims, and allows not only for rereading the radical Otherness of the undead vampire, especially that of Dracula in its ambiguity, but also for re-inscribing him within the limits of human discourse and thought.

Vampiric Alterity: Towards an Ethical Responsibility for the Persecutory Other

It is impossible to overlook the ways in which Count Dracula's voice is excluded from the anthropocentric narrative of the members of the "Crew of Light" and their almost hysterical representation of the vampire's radical Otherness (cultural, sexual, class, racial, and colonial) as a wholly different species. Nonetheless, critics have more recently traced the ways in which the

novel itself more subtly encodes Dracula as an ambivalent sign of Otherness (Hatlen 1988), and the ways in which all the characters in the novel are "in salient, surprising ways counterparts, or even collaborators" (Riquelme 2002, 561). To this extent, Stoker's classic vampire novel clears a space for reconsidering two of the perennial aporias in trauma theory and Holocaust studies: the incomprehensible inhumanity of the Other, whose motives and desires presumably exist outside the normative limits of human discourse and thought, and the intersubjective psychosexual entanglements between persecutors and victims.[11] Despite the consternation of some critics, theorists such as Caruth trace the slippages between Self and Other, victims and persecutors, noting even the reversibility of their subject positions as the persecutor becomes a victim, and the victim becomes the vehicle through which the persecutor can articulate the trauma that he can never fully know (1995, 8).

Such a complex relationship between victims and persecutors constitutes an important site for interrogating what Primo Levi calls the "gray zone," that ambivalent space of "*protekcja*," the Polish term for connections or protected privileges, and "collaboration" (1989, 42) in the concentration camp where the slippages and interchangeability between persecutors and victims are continually re-enacted. In this zone, Levi suggests, "the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge," allowing for the sharp, Manichean distinctions between persecutors and victims to collapse and the boundaries between them to blur. In the ambiguous moral topography of the concentration camp, Levi maintains, oppressors, victims, collaborators, and witnesses "are bonded together by the wish to preserve and consolidate established privilege vis-à-vis those without privilege" (1989, 43). However, Levi situates these different subject positions within "the foul link of *imposed* complicity" (54; emphasis added), for the new structure of social relations in the camp produces the false effect of "mimesis and identification" between persecutors and persecuted, oppressors and victims. This mystification of the inherent asymmetry in the power structure between them, Levi warns, can become "a moral disease or an aesthetic affectation or a sinister sign of complicity; above all it is a precious service rendered (intentionally or not) to the negators of truth" (48-49).

However, Stoker's novel also draws attention to an important issue that remains sublimated in Caruth's reconfiguration of Otherness and Levi's theorization of the "gray zone," namely the extent to which this dynamic of collaboration, complicity, and intimacy between vampires and their victims (especially Mina's relationship with Count Dracula) is implicated with the question of the eroticized nature of the violence that evolves in such horrific contexts. It may be assumed that traumatic experiences in the "gray zone"

can evacuate and displace any measure of sexual desire between persecutors and victims (Oster 2003); these experiences, nonetheless, manage to raise disconcerting questions about the ambiguous entanglement of pleasure and pain in the relations between persecutors and their victims in the "gray zone." The novel thus disassociates the voice and the desire of the Other from the realm of the grotesquely alien, re-inscribing this radical alterity *in relation to* the victim's desire within the conventions and limits of human discourse. The complexity of this perverse pleasure, I argue, takes center stage in Stoker's *Dracula*.

Stoker's classic vampire text integrates the desire of the radical Other and the intersubjective psychosexual entanglements between the vampire and his victims back into the text. It does so by representing the "gray zone" of vampiric seduction/violation as a site of an intricate web of intimacy, reciprocity, interconnection, complicity, contagion, and collaboration. Jonathan Harker's erotic encounter with the three female vampires in Castle Dracula and Count Dracula's relationships with Lucy, Renfield, and Mina, embody this dynamic of the "gray zone" in the novel. While Lucy's intimacy and Renfield's collaboration with the Count are represented within a teleological narrative of conversion or crossing over, the relationship between Jonathan and Mina and their respective persecutors-seducers opens up a space for reconsidering the victim's complicity and willingness to consort with and sexually submit to their victimizers. In particular, Dracula's relationship with Mina, which is treated more extensively in the novel, serves as a site for interrogating the perverse pleasure underpinning the formation of the "gray zone" as a site of involuntary mimesis and coerced identification between persecutors and victims. The beginning of the relationship between Mina and the Count predates his alleged attack, which the men witness and report as a violent attack. According to one of Dr. Seward's accounts, the way Dracula held Mina down by the back of the neck, forcing her to drink from the wound in his bare breast, resembles the way a "child [forces] a kitten's nose into a saucer of milk to compel it to drink" (Stoker 1997, 247). Mina, nevertheless, had exhibited symptoms of the vampiric attack much earlier than that incident—she was looking paler than usual (223, 230), and she starts to feel "terribly weak and spiritless" (228). Indeed, much like some survivors' fascination with the invincible power of their persecutors, Mina's complicity with her attacker begins the moment she deifies Dracula and transmogrifies him in that alleged attack scene into a "spiritual," divine agency (227).

Dracula's alleged attack, moreover, solidifies the link between them, and in her willingness to introject the Other Mina becomes open to the radical alterity of the Other. Stoker's text registers this new relationship, which Van Helsing calls the "Vampire's baptism of blood" (Stoker 1997, 280, 297), in

terms of hypnosis and trance, both of which presumably serve as metaphors for the coerced identification underpinning that relationship within the Manichean Victorian moral frame. Nonetheless, the text registers Mina's willingness and desire to submit to the Other and his desires. Stoker's novel reconfigures this newly discovered intimate connection between the Self and Other in three different ways. First, the novel offers an alternative account of the attack that represents it not as rape or enforced fellatio but, as Phillip Martin suggests, as a seduction scene (quoted in Gelder 1994, 71-72). Indeed, in his second account of the event, which he relays to Van Helsing right after, Dr. Seward describes the Count's hands as they "tenderly and lovingly stroked [Mina's] ruffled hair" (Stoker 1997, 249). This new relationship is also described metaphorically through Mina's new acquired ability for reading Dracula's mind telepathically, which inaugurates a new, expanding subjectivity that, as Nina Auerbach and David Skal state, "becomes mysteriously enlarged under hypnosis" (271). This intimacy between them is bi-directional, for now as Van Helsing explains, Mina can "tell what the Count see[s] and hear[s]" as much as he can "compel her mind to disclose to him that which she know" (Stoker 1997, 281). This intimacy between them thus becomes the site where Mina discovers not only her openness to the Other but her slippage into Otherness, or the Otherness of herself.

Dracula himself reminds Mina: "And you, their best beloved one, are now to me, flesh of my flesh; blood of my blood; kin of my kin . . . . and shall be later on my companion and my helper" (Stoker 1997, 252). Consequently, there is no doubt in the minds of the men that not only could Mina be "a vampire in the end," but that she has somehow already crossed over (259). And if she had already slipped into Otherness and is already implicated in the abject vampiric monstrosity itself, then the Count may not be able after all to "take [her special power] away altogether" (295). In fact, at the end of the novel, when the "Crew of Light" encounters the three female vampires, these vampires call Mina "sister," even though Van Helsing still interprets Mina's reaction to their address as an indication that "she was not, yet, of them" (317). At stake here is the reimagining of a new type of subjectivity that recognizes the capacity of the originary, authentic Self to undergo an ontological slippage into the realm of difference, that will forever implicate the Self and the Other in a recognition of the inauthenticity of origins and subjectivity.

Recognizing her intimate connections with the radical Other and the slippages between Self and Other becomes the precondition for bearing an ethical responsibility for the persecutory Other. Although Mina joins the "Crew of Light" in their hunt for the Count, she questions their motives for hunting him down. It is important to note that Mina initially frames her

questioning within a theological justification for redemption and "spiritual immortality" (Stoker 1997, 269). However, the second time she raises the question of motive, she objects on purely ethical grounds, asking "why do we need to seek him further, when he is gone away from us?" (273). Mina's sense of responsibility for her persecutor is predicated upon a structural, or preontological, condition of susceptibility that impinges on the subject. In "Substitution," Levinas asserts that this structural susceptibility emerges "in suffering, in the *original traumatism* and return to self, where I am responsible for what I did not will, absolutely responsible for the persecution I undergo . . ." (quoted in Butler 2005, 88–89). As Judith Butler explains, "That which persecutes me brings me into being, acts upon me, and so prompts me, animates me into ontology at the moment of persecution" (2005, 89). As such, responsibility for the Other, regardless of how the Other impinges or acts upon the Self, is a matter of "making use of an unwilled susceptibility as a resource for becoming responsive to the Other" (91).

Mina's intimate connection with and ethical responsibility for the Count must be understood within a shift in Stoker's narrative from the demonization of Dracula's radical Otherness, based on the reification of the vampire's perversely infinite oral and sexual desires, to a recognition of the victim's titillating erotic and aesthetic cathexis in the vampire. This shift is grounded in an engagement with what J. M. Bernstein calls "the pornography of horror" (2004), and so with the perversity of pleasure—that the horror of the trauma of the vampiric attack cannot be seamlessly disentangled from the sexualized violence of the experience in which the victim is complicit. While scenes of the sexual exploitation of trauma victims that make the link between violence and sexuality evident can be unsettling, the premise and subtext of vampiric narratives is precisely that—exposing the sexual subtext of violence, or the interconnections and subtle linkages between sexuality, violence, and death. For example, Jonathan Harker's forced stay as a prisoner at Castle Dracula and his seduction by the three female vampires, a scene that has been called "the most sustained piece of erotic writing in the novel," demonstrates the perversity of his erotic investment in his jailors (Gelder 1994, 72). Furthermore, Dr. Seward's contradictory testimony about the sexual scene between Mina and the Count opens up an ambivalent space for reconsidering Mina's sexual desire not simply as a passive victim but as a willing sexual partner.[12] Finally, the men's descriptions of Lucy as a seductive member of the undead are highly eroticized, and her death at the hands of her fiancé is not lacking in phallic symbolism that eroticizes the violence of her death (Stoker 1997, 188). Indeed, the ambiguous nature of the "shudder" that the men feel when they see Lucy becomes clearer later in the novel, when Van Helsing is preparing to dispatch the three

female vampires (188). Van Helsing describes how he was so fascinated by their sexuality, beauty, and voluptuousness that he was "moved by the mere presence of such a one," and that "the very instinct of man in me . . . made my head whirl with new emotion" (319, 320).

Underpinning this perversity of pleasure in *Dracula* is the capacity of the victims to recognize and to rearticulate their desire in conjunction with that of the Other within the same system of human representation and significa-tion. Dracula's sexuality and desire can thus assume a human dimension and can, therefore, be reinscribed within the same discursive conventions that have been exclusively applied to humans. The failure of the "Crew of Light" to see Dracula's specular image in the mirror, therefore, suggests that the real horror lies in the failure to represent those who are Othered as radically inhuman at the same level of representation, as if they are believed to lack a specular image in the mirror. To argue that the vampire's absent specularity is a reflection of his inauthenticity, and that killing this inauthentic, self-less being constitutes an act of liberation of the "'true' humanity which is trapped inside a 'false' inhumanity" is to miss the point altogether (Barrows 2006, 71). As Carol Senf correctly points out, the inability of Stoker's characters to see the vampire's image in the mirror, and by extension the failure to register the vampire within the limits of human discourse, is a "manifestation of moral blindness which reveals [their] insensitivity to others . . . " (1997, 425). As such, Stoker's novel allows the victim and the vampire, the subject and the persecutory Other, to coexist at the same level of representation in the same specular space of the mirror, in which the vampire's corporeality has long been made invisible. [13]

In this article, I have argued that trauma and its paradoxical structure constitutes a fundamental topos for understanding Stoker's *Dracula*, and that reading this classical vampire novel with and against the claims of cultural trauma theory opens both text and theory up for further investigation and elaboration. In particular, reading this novel and cultural trauma theory against the grain allows for interrogating the ways in which, as Paul Fussell wrote, "the drift of modern history domesticates the fantastic and normalizes the unspeakable" (quoted in Bartov 2003, 94). Although the vampires of the novel remain a product of the literary imagination, the Holocaust itself, as unimaginable as it was, remains in Omer Bartov's words "the product of the human imagination" (Bartov 2003, 89). For Bartov, there is something para-doxical about representing horrific events that seem to defy human under-standing. Although no fictionalization can possibly capture the reality of the Holocaust in its totality, that unimaginable reality itself emerged from the depth of the European imagination. Interestingly enough, Bartov uses the fantastic figure of the Golem to allegorize these "wholly new and indescrib-

able entities" that transcended the boundaries of human imagination (2003, 89-90). Like the vampire, such entities, as Bartov states, "have continued to haunt man's actions and phantasies, constantly hovering just under the surface, occasionally bursting out with all the ferocity of repressed, untreated passions and anxieties" (90). If critics thought that it is time to "drain *Dracula* of its *obvious* terrors," as Jennifer Wicke intimates (2002, 578; emphasis added), reading Stoker's canonical vampiric text with and against the vocabulary of trauma theory promises to delineate the more complex epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical aporias that continue to beset and haunt modern life in a post-atrocity imaginary.

Notes

[1] See Bernstein 2004, 3.

[2] For a useful review of the criticism on the vampire's sexuality, see in particular Gelder 1994.

[3] This emphasis on repression in the critical interpretation of *Dracula* could be traced back to Joseph Bierman's early examination of Stoker's repression of traumatic childhood experiences, including a prolonged illness that kept him bed-ridden for seven years, bleeding treatment, and rivalry with his younger brother.

[4] Some of these cultural trauma theorists, on whose work I am drawing, include Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, Cathy Caruth, and Geoffrey Hartman. These critics were initially affiliated with the Yale school deconstructionist project, before they turned their attention to issues of remembrance, representation, and the Holocaust. This shift in cultural trauma theory from deconstruction to ethics has been attributed, in part, to the Paul De Man affair, and coincided with the institutionalization of the 'ethical turn' in the academy in the early 1990s, especially with the reception of the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio Agamben. For a useful overview of cultural trauma theory, see Luckhurst (2006).

[5] For more on the intellectual issues raised by trauma theory, see Mandel (2001).

[6] A useful representation of the various positions on this difficult issue of the uniqueness of the Holocaust and its relation to the global politics of public memory can be found in "Uniqueness, Comparison, and the Politics of Memory," Part XI of Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg's edited collection, *The Holocaust: Theoretical Readings* (2003).

[7] For Levinas, as will be shown later, the subject is formed through an ontological dispossession by and exposure to the Other, whose address precedes the formation of the subject and constitutes it (1997, 89). The subject, that is, is impinged upon by the other, as it is given over from the start to language and signs. Levinas thus speculates that the subject is born into an ontological passivity, or a structural sus-

ceptibility, which as Judith Butler explains continues to interrupt the formation of the subject in the present (Butler 2005, 78).

[8] This discussion is indebted to Franco Moretti's examination of the systematic collation of narrative voices into a "*general* point of view, the official version of the narrative" (1997, 438; emphasis in original), and to Peter Garrett's analysis of the reflexivity and recursive structure of the novel which registers a "shift from conceal-ment to openness, from privacy to publication" (2003, 134).

[9] In this sense, Stoker's *Dracula* anticipates the rhetorical move in contemporary vampire fiction, in which the vampires' struggle for survival pales in comparison with the unspeakable and incomprehensible evil of humans. For example, Jewell Gomez's *The Gilda Stories* posits the gift (no longer a curse) of vampiric being in sharp con-trast to Gilda's pre- and post-vampiric traumatic life as a racialized, gendered subject, who was victimized and traumatized by diverse forms of persecution and abuse under the state of terror that marked the history of the racial regime in the United States. Furthermore, in Charlaine Harris's *Dead After Dark*, it's the uncle's sexual molestation of Sookie, not her willing submission to the oral and sexual needs of her vampire lover, Bill Compton, that is the true trauma (Harris 2001, 164). Indeed, the vampires now do not attack humans indiscriminately, although some do, but live off small amounts of blood that are procured from consenting humans, blood banks, or even newly invented forms of synthetic blood.

[10] For a critique of the *Muselmann* as a rhetorical figure that oversimplifies and distorts the complexity of survival, life, and death in the camps, see Mensard (2004).

[11] For more on the question of the erotics of the Holocaust, see Oster (2003), and on the suppression of the "narrative perspective" of the perpetrator, see McGlothlin (2008).

[12] This makes it possible, then, to re-examine Mina, the emblem of proper Victorian womanhood, and her potentiality for transgressive sexual performativity in terms that have been reserved in the criticism for Lucy's perverse sexuality as a "New Woman." In her complicity with Dracula and in her ambivalent recognition of her-self as Dracula's bride or wife (Stoker 1997, 321), Mina does not simply inhabit the position of a sexual victim. Her complicity and her possible polyandry clear a space for exploring the complexity of her sexual desire within fluid, polymorphous sexu-ality and sadomasochistic structures, as a sexual agent sometimes and as a willing vic-tim at other times.

[13] It could thus be argued that Stoker's *Dracula* anticipates the postmodern turn in contemporary vampiric fiction, in which the focalization of the narrative from non-human perspectives, as Joan Godron and Veronica Hollinger state, "works to invite sympathy for the monstrous outsider at the same time as it serves to diminish the terror generated by what remains outside of our frame of the familiar and the knowable" (Gordon and Hollinger 1997, 2). Indeed, in *Dracula* this sublime excess is re-incorporated into the language of the familiar and the knowable; the vampire is not meant to exist in excess of our frame of reference.

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